The owner of this website (through-the-interface.typepad.com) has banned your IP address

Whelp, I guess I didn't care that much.

Common codebase for Mac and Windows via an abstraction layer. Same code also transpiles to JavaScript.

Gdpr-shield?

My traffic is coming from a Digital Ocean NYC, in the US

I'm from EU too, but i can access it just fine.

These look really nifty. I'm hoping GitLab will add similar. I particularly like that the build can be failed due to a specific line. I've noticed that all of the CI output can be confusing for some, and it becomes difficult to suss out the specific error messages amid all the other output.

The only API they don't support that I know of that somewhat bothers me is that notifications can't have buttons or actions. The bugzilla issue[0] has been sitting without much updates for a while.

[0] https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1190681

Native apps have led to slow, bloatware-, spyware-, and malware-infested mobile devices. The browser is a much better sandbox, giving much less permissions to the untrusted code.

>HSTS wouldn't help users clicking through warning

Actually it would have! Chrome and possible other browsers do not allow clicking throw certificate validation issues on sites with HSTS. For example, try to get to https://badssl.finn.io in Chrome.

Sorry how does that help if the attackers purchase a new "valid" SSL certificate since they control the DNS and thus email?

It does not help for that scenario, but it forces the attackers to jump through another hoop, and publish that a new cert was issued for the domain.

Once you control DNS, it doesn't require email, you can just use lets-encrypt. The lets-encrypt verification does not check HSTS.

Makes sense because it keeps HSTS from the lockout scenario that makes HPKP so scary.

Is it possible to get a TLD registrar to set a very short TTL like 5min on your NS record? Then you can switch to a backup DNS hosted on another network fast.

Yes, you can set a short TTL on your NS record, but that would not keep this attack from hijacking your site. This attack intercepts the clients DNS lookup, so the DNS a browser is talking to is ill-behaved. No amount of correct setup here will work because the ill-behaved DNS server will just replace your setup with whatever that server wants.

There is no strong defense against this as a website. With an app the solution would be certificate pinning. You could try HPKP but that comes with a host of issues and I think it is being deprecated.

Wait: in example.com say .com registrar sets a 5min TTL on NS record for example.com that resolves to 1.2.3.4. That means that your DNS server is at 1.2.3.4, serving your A and MX records. An attacker BGP hijacks 1.2.3.4. You change NS record in your .com registrar settings to 5.6.7.8 that is not compromised. Notice I am not talking about your A or MX records that you controlled on a compromised IP, but of NS record that a .com registrar controls. So after 5 min the browsers contact a non-compromised nameserver at 5.6.7.8 to get your A records.

I think unless a TLD registrar gets hijacked that mitigates the attack on your own DNS after the NS TTL

You are right, I was thinking of a different attack. Something like a BGP-hijack of 8.8.8.8 , 1.1.1.1 or similar often used DNS resolvers.

Here though, people using area53 for DNS probably can't move away from it as they are stuck on amazon.

They will say that, despite it having no bearing in reality. The only time the FCC cares is if you're fucking shit up for others.

> The only time the FCC cares is if you're fucking shit up for others.

A friend who broadcast on an FM frequency that's unused locally (broadcasting family-friendly Christmas music, I might add) got shut down by the FCC, who sent out people out in the evening to have a chat with him. They care, even when you're not fucking shit up for others. I have no idea what experience you might be basing your statement on, but traditionally the local HAM guys will take offense at any little thing that comes to their attention and the FCC will be happy to follow up on it. (I know at least one local HAM who has lightened up a bit about this stuff over the years but I don't think the feds have)

When it comes to oddball noise, they'll act pretty quickly if there's someone like a busybody HAM to spell out to them exactly where the interference is coming from. Of course, plenty of times it's a HAM who is causing the interference...

Yeah completely unrealistic thinking FCC is going to call you.

They send out certified letters. Here are a few:

https://transition.fcc.gov/eb/AmateurActions/Welcome.html

That guy in Idaho running a repeater on 146.520, national simplex calling frequency for VHF. Lol. Real genius there, I'll bet it took less than a week before a complaint was filed.

Until your crummy transmitter interferes with some emergency Service. eg Police, Aircraft, etc.

Then they will be on your doorstep within hours. Complete with a search warrant and fines of thousands of dollars, along with a permanent criminal record.

...yes, as I said, as long as you aren't fucking shit up for others. I thought I was very clear about that.

And how will you be sure that you're not fucking shit up for others?

Why is is_anonymous = true for a tor relay? Why are relays and exit nodes given the same flag? As a tor relay operator, I anticipate this being misused, like so many before it, to arbitrarily block all tor relays by people who don't know or care how tor works.

Hi f2n, thank you for raising this concern. is_tor and is_anonymous are true for any and all nodes on the Tor network. I'd love to hear more about your concerns, please send me an email at jonathan at ipdata dot co

For traffic to leave the tor network, it must go via an exit node. Many nodes are just 'relays' (they allow no exiting).

A few years ago I ran a no-exit relay from home. Eventually Hulu blocked my IP, even though all traffic from my IP to hulu was from me, and not via tor. Hulu couldn't be bothered to differentiate, and just assumed that a tor node at my IP address meant that traffic coming from that IP must be something routed via Tor.

By not differentiating, you are making the same mistake, and will punish people for no reason.

Edit: Assuming you are pulling the 'exit node list' you link below, I don't see how that is happening, as it does at least claim to verify that you can actually exit through the node.

Hi colonelxc, we'll probably only include Tor exit nodes in our lists and are working to fix this. Thanks for sharing this.

At least they used the correct numbers of w's in the URL.

What does 22 w's mean?

W for Web server, behind seven www proxies. /s

"Tech is the center of our modern lives. But it's broken."

on a page that doesn't properly render without running Javascript from 2 third-party services. There are also multiple third party javascript includes explicitly for surveillance/metrics. I agree that the system is broken but I don't trust these clowns to help

I don't think anyone is arguing this is particularly worse than any other MITM performed by ISPs against their users.